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I. INTRODUCTION TO XEROX V. APPLE
Thursday, December 14, 1989, Xerox Corporation announced
to the judicial system what the technical community had known for
years.' Xerox was one of the first to commercialize, albeit unsuc-
cessfully, the widely accepted graphical user interface popularized
in the Apple Computer, Inc. Lisa and Macintosh computers.2 Re-
cently, Xerox filed a complaint in United States District Court for
the Northern District of California alleging that Apple unlawfully
and fraudulently obtained copyright protection for its Lisa and
Macintosh computer software.3 Xerox sought damages of over one
hundred million dollars.4 A copyright infringement claim was con-
spicuously absent from Xerox's complaint. The court dismissed all
the claims for damages, leaving only the surviving declaratory judg-
ment claim.5
This paper, employing the backdrop of the Xerox v. Apple suit,
investigates a court's treatment of an innovative approach to legal
protection for software. The paper describes the case and the
judge's analysis of this dynamic, legal arena, and concludes in con-
currence with the federal judiciary: copyright protection is unavail-
able under the disguise of an unfair competition complaint.
A. Background
In the mid-1970's Xerox developed an ergonomic workstation
which merged a mouse, microprocessor, high resolution graphic
display and unique software, called SMALLTALK, in a user-
friendly workstation called "Star Computer."6 Xerox alleged, and
Apple, in its answer, admitted that Steven Jobs and other Apple
employees visited Xerox PARC and were impressed with the tech-
1. Electron. Power, J. Inst. Electr. Eng. (UK), Vol. 33, No. 11, pp. 695-98 (1987); see
also, Dvorak, Inside Track, PC Magazine, March 13, 1990; The Xerox-Apple Suit Dept.: I
hope we all know that Xerox has sued Apple for using its Star technology in the Macintosh.
Maybe someone at Xerox finally read page 161 of the John Sculley book, ODYSSEY, where
Sculley, while talking about the Mac development team says: "Most of the Macintosh tech-
nology wasn't invented in the building. Indeed, the Macintosh, like the Lisa before it, was
largely a conduit for technology developed at Xerox PARC." Apparently, when Bill Lowe
came over from IBM, he nearly died from heart failure when he saw all the inventions made
at Xerox PARC that were languishing and not being licensed.
2. The Mighty Mouse, Gov. Data Syst., vol. 14, no. 2, pps. 14-16 (Feb. 1985).
3. Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer, Civil Action No. C89-4482-CALENE, USDC
NDCA (Dec. 14, 1989) [hereinafter Xerox Complaint].
4. Xerox Complaint, 34 and 42.
5. In April 1990, the final count was dismissed by Judge Walker. Xerox had one
month to file an appeal.
6. The Star User Interface: An Overview, National Computer Conference, IN AFIPS
Conference Proceedings, vol. 51 (Feb. 1982).
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niques embedded in the Star Computer.7 Subsequently, Apple in-
troduced the Lisa Computer in 1983 and followed shortly thereafter
in 1984 with the commercially successful Apple Macintosh
Computer.
B. Iconic Communication
A significant issue raised by the Xerox complaint was: who is
entitled to copyright protection for computer programs using icons
and windowing? Icons are small rectangular images that represent
functions within a system. For example, a picture of a trash can
could be used to represent a "delete" file function, as depicted at
label 40 of Figure 1.
Figure 1
10
t File Edit View Special
Slistem Disk
5Ies 311lk Indisk ngovlbe K ~ M..
Items~ ~ ~ ~ ste Diskl a .1NEmptU Folder
3 items 32k in folder 89K available
Fot50 ~'20
Syste Scrapbook File . Clipboard File
S~stem Folder _______
3 items I I5k in folder 59K evalable -r - . , :, 40
Used with permission of Apple Computer, Inc.
An early discussion of the use of icons to communicate infor-
mation via a computer display appeared in a 1971 research paper
published by W. H. Huggins.9 That paper discussed the use of sym-
7. Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer, Civil Action No. C89-4482-CALENE, USDC
NDCA (Apple Computer's Answer ified January 4, 1990) [hereinafter Apple Answer], 7,
Answering 6. "Apple is informed and believes, and on that basis admits, that in late 1979,
Steven Jobs visited Xerox PARC with other Apple employees and during that visit they were
shown a demonstration of Smalltalk."
8. Xerox Complaint, see 13-16, 19-21.
9. Huggins, W. H., Iconic Communications, IEEE Conference on Frontiers in Educa-
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bols as teaching aids to represent various phenomena. Mr. Huggins
recommended and demonstrated computer manipulation of sym-
bols on a computer display to invoke functions that the symbols
represented. His psychological research on perception indicated
that pictures and symbols play important roles in creative thought.
He advocated the use of iconic modes as a communication interface
between a user and a computer. Those ideas are now employed by
most graphic based workstations utilizing icons to provide a novice
or expert with a "user-friendly" interface to computer applica-
tions.' 0 Thus, to the extent that Xerox and/or Apple claim to be
the originator of "aesthetically pleasing graphic displays,"" they
must contend with, at least, Huggins' earlier work.
C. Windowing
Xerox and Apple also contested the origin of "graphically
complex windows."' 2 An example of a windowing system is shown
in Figure 1. Labels 10, 20 and 30 identify active "windows" that
are overlaid. The window at label 30 is the current window with
which the user is interfacing. An additional system window icon,
depicted at 60, can be used to activate other functions of the operat-
ing system or start another application program.
An early reference to a graphic display employing a window
for the presentation of information is found in an article by Mr.
Blum, presented at the Conference on Mathematical and Computer
Aids to Design held in Anaheim, California in October of 1969.
That paper discussed a program that created a window of graphic
information on an IBM 2250 terminal. The window displayed a
function graphed onto the X-Y coordinate axis of the window. Por-
tions of the window could be zoomed in or out at the user's discre-
tion, and the relative scales of the coordinate axis could be
dynamically changed.' 3
While the program described by Blum is primitive compared to
today's windowing systems, it did disclose the basic ideas used to
enable windowing. Shortly thereafter, in 1973, a Carnegie Mellon
research team developed a multi-window text editor similar to the
windowing system shown in Figure 1. That text editor exploited
tion, Atlanta, Ga., IEEE, vol. 7, pps. 17-20 (1971), see also, Huggins, W. H., Iconic Commu-
nications, IEEE Transactions on Education, Vol. E14, No. 4, pps. 158-63 (Nov. 1971).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Xerox Complaint, S 9.
13. Blum, R., Window, A Program for Graphic Manipulation of the X-Y Plane, IEEE
Digest of the 1969 Conference on Mathematical and Computer Aids to Design, Oct. 1969.
[Vol. 6
XEROX V APPLE
graphic display technology to provide simultaneous editing of a
number of files, each fie residing in its own window on the
display. 14
A later arrival in this area was the Star user interface on the
Xerox 8010 information system." The Star system improved a
computer interface by making it easy for a user to operate the com-
puter.16 The user was given a mouse to supplement the keyboard
for cursor positioning. The mouse could be used to move a cursor
around a computer display and interactively select graphic symbols
representing various functions.1 7 An example of a cursor is at label
50 in Figure 1.
Xerox patented its original mouse hardware and later obtained
design patents for its icons.1 However, Xerox did not patent the
original aspects of the early Star Software. While the authors know
of no formal written policy, it is generally understood that Xerox's
intent for its Palo Alto labs (where the Star was developed) was to
encourage "academic freedom," so as to attract quality people.
Thus, publishing of research results was encouraged and patenting
of those results was apparently not emphasized. Further, software
patents were still in their infancy at the time the original Star
software was developed.' 9 Many in the computer industry, includ-
ing Xerox and Apple, have subsequently employed patents to pro-
tect their windowing and icon interfaces.20
14. Gerhardt, Window: A Formally-Specified Graphics-Based Text Editor, Carnegie-
Mellon Dept. of Computer Science, June 1973.
15. Apple Answer, 9 10. "Apple is informed and believes, and on that basis admits, that
Xerox demonstrated the Star computer system at a trade show in 1981 and that some Apple
employees were present at the trade show and saw the demonstration or portions of it."
16. Lipkie, Star User Interface: An Overview, AGIPS Conference Proceedings, vol. 51
(1982).
17. Canfield, Star User Interface: An Overview, AGIPS Conference Proceedings, vol. 51
(1982).
18. U.S. Patent 4,409,489, Optical Cursor Control Device. For a discussion of Xerox's
Design Patents, see Kluth, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, Design Patents: A New Form of In-
tellectual Property Protection for Computer Software, vol. 5, no. 6, p. 235 et seq. (1988))
19. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (Supreme Court found that a rubber mold-
ing procedure involving a computer program was patentable subject matter).
20. See US Patents: 4,899,136 to Xerox; 4,786,893 to Apple; 4,896,291; 4,868,785;
4,862,154; 4,847,605; 4,829,470; 4,821,209; 4,814,755; 4,811,241; 4,811,240; 4,739,477;
4,731,606; 4,723,211; 4,723,210; 4,701,752; 4,688,033; 4,663,617; 4,642,790; 4,623,880;
4,598,384; 4,437,093; and 3,716,842 to IBM; 4,876,533 to Schlumberger; 4,875,034 to Daniel
Brokenshire; 4,873,652 to Data General; 4,823,303 to Toshiba; 4,814,884 to US Air Force;
4,812,834 to Cadtrac 4,533,910 to Cadtrak; 4,811,281 to Mitsubishi; 4,811,245 to General
Electric; 4,809,166 to Advanced Micro Devices; 4,794,386 to Profit Tech; 4,780,709 to Intel;
4,779,081 to Hitachi; 4,777,485 to Sun Microsystems; 4,772,881 to Silicon Graphics;
4,752,889 to Neuron Data; 4,720,703; and 4,646,078; to Tektronix; 4,710,767; and 3,531,795
to Sanders; 4,710,761; 4,700,320 and 4,555,775 to AT&T; 4,559,533; 4,550,315; and
1991]
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II. THE XEROX COMPLAINT
Xerox's complaint contained six counts. Count I sought a de-
claratory judgment that Xerox is the sole owner of the Star
software. Counts II and III endeavored to revoke Apple's Lisa and
Macintosh registrations for failing to comply with 17 U.S.C.
§§ 409(9) and 103(a) by not informing the Copyright Office that the
Apple software was a derivative work of Xerox's SMALLTALK
and Star computer software. Counts IV and V requested damages
for unfair competition allegedly caused by Apple's assertion of its
Lisa and Macintosh copyrights in the Apple v. Microsoft and Hew-
lett Packard21 copyright infringement suit. Such assertions were
said to have made potential licensees reluctant to license Xerox
technology. Finally, Count VI, under an unjust enrichment theory,
asked the court to impose a constructive trust on Apple's royalties,
license fees and judicial awards arising from Apple's copyrights.
Xerox's complaint further alleged that the Lisa and Macintosh
software incorporate substantial portions of the Star software,22 and
that no permission was sought or obtained by Apple to use the Star
software features. Xerox also declared in the complaint that it has a
valid copyright registration covering the Star software. Thus,
Xerox essentially alleged the elements of copyright infringement:
valid copyright, access and substantial similarity. It is difficult to
fathom Xerox's failure to plead copyright infringement. 23 The Dis-
4,542,376 to Unisys; 4,112,422 to Atari; 4,891,631 to Eastman Kodak; 4,813,013 to Cadware
Group LTD; and 4,873,515; 4,855,934; 4,763,280; 4,646,251; 4,625,289; 4,539638; 4,499,457;
3,889,107; and 3,816,726 to Evans and Sutherland Computer Company.
21. No. C-88-20149-WWS, 717 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Ca. 1989 (Apple sued Microsoft
and Hewlett Packard alleging copyright infringement of their graphical interface. Microsoft
and Hewlett Packard moved for summary judgment under the Agreement between Apple
and Microsoft dated November 22, 1985. The court ruled that the Agreement was not a
complete defense with respect to Windows 2.03. However, the Agreement did license
Microsoft to use visual displays and named application programs without infringement. The
only remaining issue is whether Microsoft and Hewlett Packard's overlapping main applica-
tion windows and the changes in the appearance and manipulation of icons infringes Apple's
copyright).
22. Xerox Complaint, %% 14, 16 and 17. "The registration fails to identify Lisa as a
derivative work of the Xerox Star although the copyright deposits submitted by Apple to the
US Copyright Office in support of registration depict and describe substantial portions which
are original to Star and were created, published and copyrighted by Xerox. The registration
also fails to identify Lisa as a derivative work of SMALLTALK although the copyright de-
posits submitted by Apple to the U.S. Copyright Office in support of registration depict and
describe substantial portions which are original to SMALLTALK and were created, pub-
lished and copyrighted by Xerox."
23. In Whelan v. Jaslow, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), Whelan alleged that Jaslow's
software infringed Whelan's copyright on a computer program to operate a dental laboratory
business. The court applied a two part test in its determination that Whelan's copyright was
infringed. First, the court determined that Whelan owned the copyright in its software and
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trict Court found Xerox's failure to allege copyright infringement
fatal to any recovery of damages and dismissed all counts.
III. ANALYSIS OF XEROX'S CLAIM
A. Count I - Declaratory Judgment
Xerox's sole count to escape the court's dismissal asked for a
declaratory judgment that Xerox is the originator of the Xerox Star
software. The court gave Xerox thirty days to file information es-
tablishing an actual case or controversy between Xerox and Apple
or face dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
To establish that a particular declaratory action presents an
actual case or controversy, Xerox must show that there is a substan-
tial controversy with Apple and the controversy is of sufficient im-
mediacy and reality to warrant declaratory relief.'
In International Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co.,2 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provided guidance concerning fac-
tors that would support an actual controversy. The court in Deere
was asked by International Harvester (IH) to declare that its corn
head tool did not infringe a United States patent held by Deere &
Company (Deere). IH established that Deere's patent was the sub-
ject of another pending infringement suit. However, IH failed to
establish that it had a reasonable apprehension of suit or threat of
suit as a result of any action by Deere. Thus, the court dismissed
the case because IH could not meet its burden of establishing an
actual controversy between itself and Deere.26 Likewise, Xerox es-
tablished that Apple had sued others for copyright infringement,
but did not advance any reasons for reasonable apprehension of a
suit aimed at Xerox.
secondly that Jaslow had copied Whelan's software. To show copying, the court relied on the
widely accepted factors of access and substantial similarity between the alleged copy and the
original software. Instead of applying a two tier test for substantial similarity, the court
adopted a single, substantial similarity inquiry in which both lay and expert testimony was
admissible. Applying the test to our facts, Xerox alleges ownership of the Star software,
alleges Apple had access through former employees, and alleges that the Apple Lisa and
Macintosh are substantially similar to the Star software. Thus, the elements of copyright
infringement are plead without a copyright infringement count.
24. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 883 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1989). The
worldwide television rights to many of Laurel and Hardy silent films were contested in this
case. Of importance was the court's finding that a declaratory judgment action required a
real and reasonable apprehension that plaintiff will be subject to liability if he continues to
manufacture his product. Further, the apprehension must be caused by the defendant's
actions.
25. 623 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980).
26. Ia
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In State of Texas v. West Publishing Company,27 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused subject matter jurisdiction to
the State of Texas in its attempt to obtain a declaratory judgment
invalidating West's copyright in its arrangement of Texas Statutes.
The court explained, "the plaintiff must show that it has actually
published or is preparing to publish the material that is subject to
the defendant's copyright and that such publication places the par-
ties in a legally adverse position."2 Similarly, Xerox must establish
an adverse position based on an actual case or controversy, such as
a copyright infringement claim against Apple. A less likely altema-
tive is for Xerox to somehow provoke Apple to sue it for copyright
infringement.
B. Counts II & III - Revocation of Apple's Copyright
Registration
Counts II and III sought the court's assistance in revoking Ap-
ple's Lisa and Macintosh registrations for failing to comply with 17
U.S.C. §§ 409(9) and 103(a).29 Xerox argued the registrations were
invalid because Apple had not informed the Copyright Office that
the Apple software was a derivative work of Xerox's
SMALLTALK and Star computer software. The court dismissed
these counts on the ground that such allegations must be initially
pursued by administrative challenge before the Copyright Office.30
Xerox is premature in its attempt to enlist the court's aid. The
Copyright Office regulations, on the other hand, provide an express
administrative remedy.31 A proper avenue to Federal District
27. 882 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1989).
28. Texas v. West, 882 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 1989).
29. "17 U.S.C. § 409(9)("The application for copyright registration shall be made on a
form prescribed by the Register of Copyrights and shall include-... (9) in the case of a
compilation or derivative work, an identification of any preexisting work or works that is
based on or incorporates, and a brief, general statement of the additional material covered by
the copyright claim being registered; .. "); 17 U.S.C. § 103(a)("The subject matter of copy-
right as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works, but protection
for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any
part of the work in which material has been used unlawfully.")
30. Kiddie Rides U.S.A. v. Donald C. Curran, 231 USPQ 210 (D.D.C. 1986). The
court awarded Kiddie Rides costs and attorney fees after setting aside the action of the Copy-
right Office in cancelling Copyright registrations for amusement ride toys. A court review of
a final administrative action by the Copyright Office is proper.
31. 37 C.F.R. § 201.7: Cancellation of completed registrations .... Circumstances
under which a registration will be cancelled. (1) Where the Copyright Office becomes aware
after registration that a work is not copyrightable, either because the authorship is de minimis
or the work does not contain authorship subject to copyright, the registration will be can-
celled... (4) Where registration has been made for a work which appears to be copyrightable
but after registration the Copyright Office becomes aware that, on the administrative record
[Vol. 6
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Court review would entail Xerox requesting an initial administra-
tive review before the Copyright Office, and then appealing an ad-
verse decision to a Federal District Court. 2 Alternatively, Xerox
could bring an infringement action alleging Apple's Lisa and Mac-
intosh were derived from Xerox's Star computer program. How-
ever, as noted above, Xerox to date has chosen not to bring a
copyright infringement action.
Thus, as noted by Apple, and accepted by the court, a suit for
cancellation of a registration because of an alleged omission of rele-
vant information concerning the copyrighted work must initially be
pursued before the Copyright Office.
C. Counts IV, V & VI - Unfair Competition & Unjust
Enrichment
The primary underpinnings of Xerox's complaint are in federal
and state unfair competition claims.33 The doctrine of unfair com-
petition is based upon the principle that one may not unfairly ap-
propriate a competitor's skill, expenditure or labor. It prohibits,
among other things, false advertising and "passing off" another's
work as one's own.3 4 The policy behind the law of unfair competi-
before the Office, the statutory requirements have apparently not been satisfied, or that infor-
mation essential to registration has been omitted entirely from the application or is questiona-
ble,.. . the registration will be cancelled (emphasis. added). Unlike the rigorous examination
that patent applications are put through, the Copyright Office performs an administrative
review of registration forms with little substantive review of the applications unless a registra-
tion is challenged.
32. Techniques v. Rohn, 592 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) presented another failed
example of an attempt to invalidate a copyright registration in Federal Court. The Tech-
niques court held, "the only remedy available for the non-registrant is to apply for registra-
tion. Then, if the application is denied, the applicant may seek a writ of mandamus against
the Registrar of Copyrights." Id. at 1198.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1125: False designations of origin and false descriptions forbidden (a)
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods,
uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or
any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, false or misleading
representations of fact, which (1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or.. ., or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of
his or her goods, services, or commercial activities of another person .... Patent Trademark
and Copyright Laws, BNA, at p. 118 et seq. (1989).
California Business and Professions Code § 17200, "Definition: As used in this chapter,
unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice
and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1
(commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions
Code."
34. Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1980). Carter
used baby oil in its Nair hair removal product and used their advertising campaign to give
consumers the false impression that Nair was a J & J product. The court granted relief for
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tion is to avoid confusion in consumer's minds. The principal test is
referred to as a "likelihood of confusion" analysis. 35 A court exam-
ines the facts to determine if a defendant's acts are likely to cause
confusion in the marketplace.16 Thus, it is not necessary for the
plaintiff to show evidence of actual buyer confusion in order to
show a likelihood of confusion.'7
Xerox claims that Apple has confused the computer industry
by suing companies for copyright infringement of Apple's software
when substantial portions of the software was originated by
Xerox. 38 At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Apple's attorney
likened the Xerox unfair competition and unjust enrichment counts
to a pair of beavers at the Hoover Dam. One beaver turned to an-
other beaver and asked if he had created the Hoover Dam. The
other beaver quipped, "No, but it's based on an idea I had." Xerox,
like the pioneer beaver that originated the idea of damming streams,
made no more headway than the beaver.
1. California Unfair Competition
The court found that no private right of action for damages
exists under the California unfair competition statutes. The court
followed Little Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.3 9 as a controlling
precedent eliminating any California unfair competition private suit
for damages. In Little, federal deregulation of the oil and gas indus-
try prompted Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) to make changes in its
business and marketing practices with a resulting adverse impact on
Little. Little sued ARCO under the Petroleum Marketing Practices
Act and the statutes codifying California unfair competition laws.'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dis-
missal of Little's case. Xerox was a private party seeking damages
under California unfair competition laws. The court followed Little
and, therefore dismissed Xerox's California unfair competition
claims.
Johnson & Johnson based on a reasonable basis for the belief that the plaintiff is likely to be
damaged as a result of the false advertising.
35. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Properties, Inc., 307 F.2d 495, 134 USPQ 467.
36. Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 197 F. Supp. 524, 131
USPQ 244.
37. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, (USCA 2d Cir. 1959).
The court applied a likelihood of public confusion test to hold that even an unintentional use
of the same mark in the same market area constitutes an infringment.
38. Xerox Complaint, %% 1-24.
39. 852 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1988).
40. California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.
416 [Vol. 6
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2. Federal Preemption of Counts IV and VI
The court was also persuaded by a preemption challenge of
Counts IV and VI. It accepted Apple's arguments that Counts IV
and VI of its complaint are equivalent to exclusive rights afforded
by the Copyright Act.
Federal preemption is an important question in any case where
Congress has afforded federal protection under constitutional direc-
tion. One area where Congress has spoken that is pertinent to the
Xerox v. Apple case is the Copyright Act of 1976.41 The availability
of copyright for computer programs does not, of course, affect the
availability of trade secret or other common or federal law protec-
tion. Under the Copyright Act only those state rights that are
equivalent to the exclusive rights of the Copyright Act granted
therein are preempted.42
Courts employ a two-tier inquiry to determine if a state law,
such as a state unfair competition statute, is preempted by federal
law.43 The first inquiry determines if the subject matter falls within
Sections 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act." If the subject matter
is within Sections 102 and 103, then a second test is applied to de-
termine if the right being protected by the state law is within the
general scope of protection afforded by Section 106.11 If the legal or
equitable rights are equivalent to exclusive rights within the scope
of the Copyright Act, then the state law is unenforceable.'
Apple successfully argued an analogy to Del Madera Properties
v. Rhodes & Gardener, Inc.47 In Del Madera, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal-of Del Madera's unfair
competition and unjust enrichment claims based on alleged misap-
propriation of its copyrighted map. The court applied the two-
tiered preemption test under Section 301 and found that misappro-
priation of an author's talent and effort in creating a work is pre-
cisely the type of activity the copyright laws are designed to protect
against. The court reasoned that ownership of the misappropriated
information and a misappropriation of same are "part and parcel of
41. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
42. LATMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES, CONTEMPORARY LEGAL EDUCATION
SERIES, Chapter 2 - Copyrightable Subject Matter (1990).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1989).
44. Id. § 102 and § 106.
45. Id. § 106.
46. Vault Corp* v. Quaid Software Limited, 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987), aff'd,
847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). Louisiana's Software License Enforcement Act preempted by
federal copyright law.
47. 820 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1987).
1991]
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the copyright claim."4 The court also noted that the heart of the
unjust enrichment claim is an implied promise not to use the copy-
righted map. An implied promise not to use or copy materials that
are protected by copyright is equivalent to the protection afforded
by Section 106 of the Copyright Act. Thus, the court in Del Ma-
dera held the unfair competition and unjust enrichment claims were
preempted by the Copyright Act.4 9
Similarly, the heart of Xerox's California claims for unfair
competition and unjust enrichment were found to be intertwined
with an attempt to prevent Apple from preparing a derivative work
under Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act. (In essence it was an
attempt to punish Apple for making unauthorized reproductions of
the same). This protection is identical to a copyright infringement
act brought under the Copyright Act. Thus, the court found the
action was preempted.
3. Federal Unfair Competition
The court followed Chromium Industry v. Mirror Polishing &
Plating Co. 50 in dismissing Xerox's federal unfair competition claim
under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. In the Chromium case, the
defendant's product was alleged to be protected by a patent that the
plaintiff claimed was invalid. Plaintiff insisted that defendant's false
representations concerning the patent were misrepresentations that
caused confusion in the marketplace. The court summarily dis-
missed the claim, basing its decision on the presumption of validity
associated with an issued patent.
The Chromium case ruling on the first count was found to be
directly analogous to Xerox's claims. There was no allegation that
Apple told Xerox or any of Xerox's customers that Xerox infringed
Apple's copyright. Rather, Apple asserted its copyright against al-
leged infringers. By doing so, Apple did not assert that they were
the sole source of windowing and icon systems or in any way imply
any relationship to the Xerox Star system. Xerox incorrectly im-
plied that Apple's assertion of its copyright indicated that Apple is
the originator of every element or feature of the Apple system. As
the judge pointed out to Xerox, there is nothing to prevent Hewlett
Packard and Microsoft from asserting originality as a defense in an
actual case and controversy brought under copyright infringement.
48. Del Madera, 820 F.2d 973, 983 (1987).
49. Id.
50. 448 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. IMI. 1978).
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However, Xerox cannot bootstrap a copyright infringement action
onto a federal unfair competition action.
D. Apple Defenses
Had the case been heard on the merits, Xerox faced a strong
challenge to its claim due to Apple's defenses of an elapsed statute
of limitations and laches.
1. Statute of Limitations
Apple's answer asserts that Xerox's claims are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.51 It is unclear from Apple's an-
swer what "applicable" statute of limitations was being asserted.
Under Section 507 of the Copyright Act, there is a three year limit
for both civil and criminal actions. The time period is measured
from the time of the act of infringement sued upon. If such act
occurred within three years prior to filing of the complaint, the ac-
tion will not be barred even if prior infringements by the same party
as to the same work are barred because they occurred more than
three years previously.52
The more difficult question is whether alleged repeated acts of
infringement by Apple would constitute a single continuous wrong,
so that Xerox would have been barred from bringing any suit.53
The Lanham Act does not have its own statute of limitations,
so the applicable state statute is used.54 Unfair competition claims
are controlled by a four year period set forth in the California Busi-
ness and Professions Code Section 17208. Section 17208 prescribes
a statute of limitations for claims under the California Unfair Busi-
ness Practices Act. Thus, an action would only arise based on an
act which occurred within a four year period.55 Therefore, Xerox's
51. Apple Answer, Fourth Affirmative Defense p. 7. "Xerox's claims are barred by the
applicable statutes of limitation."
52. Mount v. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 555 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1977); see also M.
NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.05 (1989).
53. Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983); but see, Gaste v. Kaiserman, 669
F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
54. Fox Chemical v. Amsoil, 445 F. Supp. 1355, 197 USPQ 898 (D. Minn. 1978).
55. Adrian C. Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 871 F.2d 784 (1989); Rejection of Rehearing
En Banc July 13, 1989. Eichman's unfair business practice claims are controlled by the four
year statute of limitations of California Business and Professions Code § 17208. Section
17208 prescribes the statute of limitations for claims under the California Unfair Business
Practices Act, California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. Accordingly, only
those claims based on conduct that occurred prior to the four year period are barred by the
statute of limitations.
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claim to damages is limited to claims that have occurred prior to
the date of their complaint.
2. Laches
Since Xerox has been aware of Apple's marketing activities for
an extended period of time, a defense of laches is probably available
to Apple. Laches is an equitable defense based upon the initiation
of a lawsuit being delayed or neglected and damages thereby com-
pounded.16 A lawsuit must be brought in a timely manner once the
complained of damage is detected. However, mere delay will not
create a bar on the ground of laches unless the delay is inexcusable
and prejudicial to the defendant by reason of reliance or change of
position as a result of such delay." Whether the claim of laches is
sufficient to bar relief depends on a consideration of the circum-
stances of each particular case and a balancing of the interests and
equities of the parties.58 Should it have proven necessary, Apple
could have shown that it had relied on Xerox's inaction while it
actively marketed its Macintosh product.
IV. CONCLUSION
Xerox's Achilles heel was its failure to bring suit in a timely
manner. The court dismissed all but one of Xerox's counts on
March 23, 1990, citing copyright infringement as the only appropri-
ate remedy available to Xerox. The judge repeatedly asked Xerox
why it had not alleged copyright infringement, but received no sat-
isfactory answer. Finally, the judge asked Xerox what would pre-
vent Hewlett Packard and Microsoft, in their pending litigation,
from asserting Xerox's arguments in an attempt to invalidate Ap-
ple's copyright. Xerox's attorney noted a fact the judge must also
have been aware of, "they already have, your Honor." Thus, it ap-
pears the battleground has shifted to an actual case and controversy
in copyright infringement, and Xerox's nap has probably cost it any
legal damages to which it might once have been entitled.
56. Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922).
57. Baez v. Fantasy Records, Inc., 144 USPQ 537 (1964); Brunswick v. Spinit Reel
Company, 823 F.2d 513, 4 USPQ2d 1497 (10th Cir. 1987). Spinit manufactured a knockoff
spin cast reel to unfairly compete with a Zebco reel. Spinit asserted the defense of laches due
to Brunswick's failure to file suit until more than a year after notice of sales of the Spinit reel.
However, the court, citing many other federal cases, found that "mere passage of time does
not constitute laches; defendant must also have been lulled into a false sense of security and
act in reliance."
58. Cuban Cigar Brands N.V. v. Upmann International, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1090, 199
USPQ 193 (SDNY 1978).
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